The Demand for Medical Care: What People Pay Does Matter
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 88 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Valentino Dardanoni & Paolo Li Donni, 2012.
"Incentive and Selection Effects of Medigap Insurance on Inpatient Care,"
EIEF Working Papers Series
1203, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Feb 2012.
- Dardanoni, Valentino & Li Donni, Paolo, 2012. "Incentive and selection effects of Medigap insurance on inpatient care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 457-470.
- Lucien Gardiol & Pierre-Yves Geoffard & Chantal Grandchamp, 2005.
"Separating selection and incentive effects in health insurance,"
PSE Working Papers
- Gardiol, Lucien & Geoffard, Pierre-Yves & Grandchamp, Chantal, 2005. "Separating Selection and Incentive Effects in Health Insurance," CEPR Discussion Papers 5380, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Duarte, Fabian, 2012. "Price elasticity of expenditure across health care services," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 824-841.
- Cogan, John F. & Hubbard, R. Glenn & Kessler, Daniel P., 2011. "The Effect Of Tax Preferences On Health Spending," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 64(3), pages 795-816, September.
- Trottmann, Maria & Zweifel, Peter & Beck, Konstantin, 2012. "Supply-side and demand-side cost sharing in deregulated social health insurance: Which is more effective?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 231-242.
- John F. Cogan & R. Glenn Hubbard & Daniel P. Kessler, 2006. "Evaluating Effects of Tax Preferences on Health Care Spending and Federal Revenues," NBER Working Papers 12733, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Philippe Batifoulier, 2014. "De l’aléa moral du patient aux inégalités d’accès aux soins," EconomiX Working Papers 2014-7, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
- Lucien Gardiol & Pierre-Yves Geoffard & Chantal Grandchamp, 2005. "Separating selection and incentive effects in health insurance," Working Papers halshs-00590713, HAL.
- John F. Cogan & R. Glenn Hubbard & Daniel P. Kessler, 2008. "The Effect of Tax Preferences on Health Spending," NBER Working Papers 13767, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Osmers, Henning & Vauth, Christoph, 2004. "Empirische Erfahrungen, Versichertenverhalten zu steuern," Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen FakultÃ¤t der Leibniz UniversitÃ¤t Hannover dp-294, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.