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Ordinary elections and constitutional arrangements
[Elections ordinaires et aménagements constitutionnels]

Author

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  • Pierre Salmon

    (LATEC - Laboratoire d'Analyse et de Techniques Economiques [UMR 5118] - UB - Université de Bourgogne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

It is widely held that voting in the course of ordinary elections has no significant influence on the constitutional regime or order of a country. At least three powerful arguments are provided in support of that view. First, to claim that, at the same time as they play, players can change the rules is, to say the least, logically puzzling. A second argument refers to the motivations and possibilities of voters : voters, this argument says, are not really interested in constitutional issues and, even if they were, are particularly ill-equiped to understand their implications. The third argument rests on the observation of what obtains in practice : as a matter of fact, constitutional issues are generally absent from electoral campaigns. After a discussion of what should be included in the constitutional order, regime or arrangements of a country, the paper endeavours to neutralize each of the three arguments and show that voters do exercise a very susbstantial influence on constitutional matters simply by the way of their vote in ordinary elections

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Salmon, 1999. "Ordinary elections and constitutional arrangements [Elections ordinaires et aménagements constitutionnels]," Working Papers hal-01526528, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01526528
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01526528
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tirole, Jean, 1994. "The Internal Organization of Government," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
    2. Salmon, Pierre, 1987. "Decentralisation as an Incentive Scheme," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 3(2), pages 24-43, Summer.
    3. Albert Breton & Gianluigi Galeotti & Pierre Salmon & Ronald Wintrobe, 1995. "Nationalism and Rationality," Post-Print hal-00445587, HAL.
    4. Steven Maser, 1985. "Demographic factors affecting constitutional decisions: the case of municipal charters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 121-162, January.
    5. Giovanni Sartori, 1994. "Comparative Constitutional Engineering," International Economic Association Series, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-22861-4, December.
    6. Albert Breton & Galeotti Gianluigi & Pierre Salmon & Ronald Wintrobe, 1991. "The Competitive State," Post-Print hal-00445590, HAL.
    7. Peter Ordeshook, 1992. "Constitutional stability," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 137-175, March.
    8. William Niskanen, 1990. "Conditions affecting the survivial of constitutional rules," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 53-62, March.
    9. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    10. Mueller,Dennis C. (ed.), 1997. "Perspectives on Public Choice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521553773.
    11. SALMON, Pierre, 1993. "Nations Conspiring against Themselves : an Interpretation of European Integration," LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) 1993-02, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
    12. Albert Breton & Gianluigi Galeotti & Pierre Salmon & Ronald Wintrobe, 1997. "Understanding Democracy: Economic and Political Perspectives," Post-Print hal-00445586, HAL.
    13. James Buchanan, 1990. "The domain of constitutional economics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-18, December.
    14. Russell Hardin, 1990. "Contractarianism: Wistful thinking," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 35-52, March.
    15. Pierre Salmon, 1991. "Checks and balances and international openness," Post-Print hal-00445591, HAL.
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    Cited by:

    1. BRETON, Albert & SALMON, Pierre, 2002. "Constitutional rules and competitive politics : their effects on secessionism," LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) 2002-06, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
    2. Pierre Salmon, 2001. "Constitutional Implications of Electoral Assumptions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 333-349, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    General Studies. Ideologies.; Political sociology of International Relations; Sociology daily life; Voter; Sociologie; Constitution; Electeur; Election; Etudes générales. Idéologies.; Sociologie politique;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)

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