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Contractarianism: Wistful thinking

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  • Russell Hardin

Abstract

The contract metaphor in political and moral theory is misguided. It is a poor metaphor both descriptively and normatively, but here I address its normative problems. Normatively, contractarianism is supposed to give justifications for political institutions and for moral rules, just as contracting in the law is supposed to give justification for claims of obligation based on consent or agreement. This metaphorical association fails for several reasons. First, actual contracts generally govern prisoner's dilemma, or exchange, relations; the so-called social contract governs these and more diverse interactions as well. Second, agreement, which is the moral basis of contractarianism, is not right-making per se. Third, a contract in law gives information on what are the interests of the parties; a hypothetical social contract requires such knowledge, it does not reveal it. Hence, much of contemporary contractarian theory is perversely rationalist at its base because it requires prior, rational derivation of interests or other values. Finally, contractarian moral theory has the further disadvantage that, unlike contract in the law, its agreements cannot be connected to relevant motivations to abide by them. Copyright George Mason University 1990

Suggested Citation

  • Russell Hardin, 1990. "Contractarianism: Wistful thinking," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 35-52, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:1:y:1990:i:2:p:35-52
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02393040
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Salmon, 1999. "Ordinary elections and constitutional arrangements [Elections ordinaires et aménagements constitutionnels]," Working Papers hal-01526528, HAL.
    2. Christian Cordes & Christian Schubert, 2007. "Toward a naturalistic foundation of the social contract," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 35-62, March.
    3. Kenneth L. Avio, 1997. "Constitutional Contract and Discourse Ethics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 9(4), pages 533-553, October.
    4. Magnouloux Hervé, 1995. "Des Regles Constitutionnelles aux Preferences Ethiques : Pertinence de l' Approche Contractualiste," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2-3), pages 1-20, June.
    5. Young, Andrew T., 2022. "Consent or coordination? assemblies in early medieval Europe," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    6. Erik W. Matson & Daniel B. Klein, 2022. "Convention without convening," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 1-24, March.

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