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Constitutional rules and competitive politics : their effects on secessionism

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Author Info
BRETON, Albert (Department of Economics - University of Toronto)
SALMON, Pierre () (LATEC - Université de Bourgogne)

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Abstract

Albert Breton and Pierre Salmon argue that the effects of constitutional rules depend on the nature of political competition and on some meta-rules that contain procedures regulating the application and the modification of constitutional rules. They outline two models of competition - electoral competition and compound government competition - and describe the nature of the transactions between the parties involved in the two corresponding settings. In both, the transactions are over constitutional rules and ordinary goods and services, all of which are arguments in the utility functions of citizens. To make the discussion more concrete, the paper focuses on the demand for political autonomy, a variable which, at the limit, becomes a demand for secession and independence. This allows the specification of some meta-rules applicable to secessionism. In this particular context, it appears that relatively small differences in the content of the meta-rules lead to large differences in equilibrium outcomes.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne in its series LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) with number 2002-06.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2002
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Handle: RePEc:lat:lateco:2002-06

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Related research
Keywords: constitutional economics; political competition; secessionism;

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Bolton, Patrick & Roland, Gerard & Spolaore, Enrico, 1996. "Economic theories of the break-up and integration of nations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 697-705, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kelvin J. Lancaster, 1966. "A New Approach to Consumer Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74, pages 132. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Alesina, Alberto & Spolaore, Enrico, 1997. "On the Number and Size of Nations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1027-56, November.
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  4. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2000. "Probabilistic Voting and Equilibrium: An Impossibility Result," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 35-48, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. SALMON, Pierre, 1999. "Ordinary elections and constitutional arrangement," LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) 1999-10, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
  6. Bordignon, Massimo & Brusco, Sandro, 2001. "Optimal secession rules," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 1811-1834, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Dan Usher, 1994. "The Significance of the Probabilistic Voting Theorem," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(2), pages 433-45, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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