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Competitive Governments

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  • Breton,Albert
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    Abstract

    Competitive Governments, first published in 1996, explores in a systematic way the hypothesis that governments are internally competitive, that they are competitive in their relations with each other and in their relations with other institutions in society which, like them, supply consuming households with goods and services. Breton contends that competition not only serves to bring the political system to an equilibrium, but it also leads to a revelation of the households' true demand functions for publicly provided goods and services and to the molding of a link between the quantities and the qualities demanded and supplied and the tax prices paid for these goods and services. In the real world where information is costly, the links may not be first-best, but they will be efficient if competition is vigorous.

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    Bibliographic Info

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    This book is provided by Cambridge University Press in its series Cambridge Books with number 9780521481021 and published in 1996.

    Order: http://www.cambridge.org/uk/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521481021
    Handle: RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521481021

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    Web page: http://www.cambridge.org

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    Cited by:
    1. J. Ferris & Stanley Winer & Bernard Grofman, 2012. "Do departures from democratic accountability compromise the stability of public finances? Keynesianism, central banking, and minority governments in the Canadian system of party government, 1867–200," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 213-243, September.
    2. Bruno S. Frey, . "A Utopia? Government Without Territorial Monopoly," IEW - Working Papers 047, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    3. Ribot, Jesse C. & Agrawal, Arun & Larson, Anne M., 2006. "Recentralizing While Decentralizing: How National Governments Reappropriate Forest Resources," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(11), pages 1864-1886, November.
    4. Mueller, Dennis C., 2004. "Rights and citizenship in a world of global terrorism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 335-348, June.
    5. Kumar, Surender & Managi, Shunsuke, 2012. "Productivity and convergence in India: A state-level analysis," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 548-559.
    6. BRETON, Albert & SALMON, Pierre, 2002. "Constitutional rules and competitive politics : their effects on secessionism," LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) 2002-06, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
    7. Joan Costa-i-Font & Filipe De-Albuquerque & Hristos Doucouliagos, 2011. "How significant are fiscal interactions in federations?: a meta-regression analysis," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 37536, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    8. Albert Breton & Heinrich Ursprung, 2002. "Globalisation, Competitive Governments, and Constitutional Choice in Europe," CESifo Working Paper Series 657, CESifo Group Munich.
    9. Kumar, Surender & Managi, Shunsuke, 2009. "Compensation for environmental services and intergovernmental fiscal transfers: The case of India," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(12), pages 3052-3059, October.
    10. Panizza, Ugo, 1999. "On the determinants of fiscal centralization: Theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 97-139, October.
    11. M. Govinda Rao, 2013. "Property Tax System in India: Problems and Prospects of Reform," Working Papers 13/114, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.

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