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Crédibilité et currency board : le cas lituanien

Author

Listed:
  • Jérôme Blanc

    (LEFI - Laboratoire d'Economie de la Firme et des Institutions - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2)

  • Jean-François Ponsot

    (LEPII - Laboratoire d'Economie de la Production et de l'Intégration Internationale - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The lithuanian currency board established in april, 1994 came along with the monetary stability, but it did not benefit from the credibility effect which it was supposed to bring. The text tries to explain this lack of credibility. A first part examines the current hypothesis according to which the differences between the pure model of currency board, supposed to bring credibility by itself, and the lithuanian model, is at the origin of this default. A second part examines the circumstances and effects of the systemic banking crisis of 1995-96. A third part deals with the consequences of the exogeneous shocks on the Lithuanian economy. This leads to another hypothesis: the constraints of the currency board – may it be impure – induced the need to restore discretionary capacities, what was translated as a denaturation. The lack of credibility is then the product of the currency board itself.

Suggested Citation

  • Jérôme Blanc & Jean-François Ponsot, 2004. "Crédibilité et currency board : le cas lituanien," Post-Print halshs-00144002, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00144002
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00144002
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nenovsky Nikolay & Hristov Kalin & Mihaylov Mihail, 2001. "Comparing Currency Board Automatic Mechanism in Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 11(4), pages 1-44, December.
    2. Kornélia Krajnyák & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 1998. "Competitiveness in Transition Economies: What Scope for Real Appreciation?," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(2), pages 309-362, June.
    3. Mr. Wayne W. Camard, 1996. "Discretion with Rules? Lessons from the Currency Board Arrangement in Lithuania," IMF Policy Discussion Papers 1996/001, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean Baptiste Desquilbet & Nikolay Nenovsky, 2004. "Credibility and adjustment: gold standards versus currency boards," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-692, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    2. Moustapha Aman, 2020. "Currency Board enjeux, mécanismes et limites," Working Papers hal-02975186, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Currency board. Credibility. Monetary policy. Banking crisis.; Caisse d'émission. Crédibilité. Politique monétaire. Crise bancaire; Caisse d'émission. Crédibilité. Politique monétaire. Crise bancaire.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange

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