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Un modèle de conditionnalité ex ante de l'intervention multilaterale

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  • Cécile Bastidon

    ()
    (LEAD - Laboratoire d'Économie Appliquée au Développement - Université Sud Toulon Var)

Abstract

Notre objet est de déterminer si une conditionnalité de type ex ante, où l'évaluation précède le prêt, limite les comportements d'aléa moral liés à l'intervention du FMI. Le modèle comprend deux catégories d'investissements privés : durables, et spéculatifs. L'évaluation par le FMI donne lieu à une note, qui conditionne le prêt, mais aussi les investissements durables. Les investissements spéculatifs sont liés à logique d'aléa moral pur. Sous nos hypothèses, la conditionnalité ex ante est préférable à la conditionnalité ex post en termes d'allocation optimale des ressources multilatérales et de prévention des crises, même si l'importance accordée à la stabilisation à court terme du système de financement international entraîne la persistance d'un aléa moral de l'emprunteur.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00731610.

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Date of creation: 05 Jun 2003
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Publication status: Published - Presented, 20èmes Journées Internationales d'Economie Monétaire et Bancaire, GDR Economie Monétaire et Financière, 2003, Birmingham, United Kingdom
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00731610

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Related research

Keywords: dette souveraine et crises de dette ; asymétries d'information ; Institutions Financières Internationales;

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  1. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  2. Eichengreen, Barry & Ruehl, Christoph, 2000. "The Bail-In Problem: Systematic Goals, Ad Hoc Means," CEPR Discussion Papers 2427, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Haizhou Huang & Charles Goodhart, 1999. "A Simple Model of an International Lender of Last Resort," FMG Discussion Papers dp336, Financial Markets Group.
  4. Haizhou Huang & C. A. E. Goodhart, 1999. "A Model of the Lender of Last Resort," IMF Working Papers 99/39, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Houba, Harold & Sneek, Koos & Vardy, Felix, 2000. "Can negotiations prevent fish wars?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(8), pages 1265-1280, July.
  6. Fischer, Stanley, 1999. "Reforming the International Financial System," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(459), pages F557-76, November.
  7. Casella, Alessandra & Eichengreen, Barry, 1996. "Can Foreign Aid Accelerate Stabilisation?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(436), pages 605-19, May.
  8. Kenneth Rogoff, 1999. "International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 21-42, Fall.
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