A coalition formation value for games with externalities
AbstractThe coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequately modeled by using games in partition function form (PFF games), proposed by Thrall and Lucas. If we suppose that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total surplus, a central question is how to allocate the worth of the grand coalition to each player, i.e., how to find an adequate solution concept, taking into account the whole process of coalition formation. We propose in this paper the original concepts of scenario-value, process-value and coalition formation value, which represent the average contribution of players in a scenario (a particular sequence of coalitions within a given coalition formation process), in a process (a sequence of partitions of the society), and in the whole (all processes being taken into account), respectively. We give an application to Cournot oligopoly, and two axiomatizations of the scenario-value.
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Date of creation: May 2011
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Coalition formation; games in partition function form; solution concept; Cournot oligopoly.;
Other versions of this item:
- Michel Grabisch & Yukihiko Funaki, 2008. "A coalition formation value for games with externalities," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne b08076, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-12-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-12-14 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2008-12-14 (Game Theory)
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- Eyckmans, Johan & Finus, Michael & Mallozzi, Lina, 2011.
"A New Class of Welfare Maximizing Stable Sharing Rules for Partition Function Games with Externalities,"
2011/08, Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel, Faculteit Economie en Management.
- Eyckmans, Johan & Finus, Michael & Mallozzi, Lina, 2011. "A New Class of Welfare Maximizing Stable Sharing Rules for Partition Function Games with Externalities," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/409419, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Eyckmans, Johan & Finus, Michael & Mallozzy, Lina, 2010. "A New Class of Welfare Maximizing Stable Sharing Rules for Partition Function Games with Externalities," Department of Economics Working Papers 32513, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
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