Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Dividends and Weighted Values in Games with Externalities

Contents:

Author Info

  • Inés Macho-Stadler
  • David Pérez-Castrillo
  • David Wettstein

Abstract

We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. We show that with this definition and equal sharing of these dividends the averaged sum of dividends for each player, over all the coalitions that contain the player, coincides with the corresponding average value of the player. We then construct weighted Shapley values by departing from equal division of dividends and finally, for each such value, provide a bidding mechanism implementing it.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://research.barcelonagse.eu/tmp/working_papers/366.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 366.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Nov 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:366

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27, 08005 Barcelona
Phone: +34 93 542-1222
Fax: +34 93 542-1223
Email:
Web page: http://www.barcelonagse.eu
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Bolger, E M, 1989. "A Set of Axioms for a Value for Partition Function Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 37-44.
  2. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May.
  3. Ines Macho-Stadler & David Perez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2009. "Dividends and Weighted Values in Games with Externalities," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics 0906, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  4. Bhaskar Dutta & Lars Ehlers & Anirban Kar, 2008. "Externalities, Potential, Value And Consistency," Working papers 168, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  5. McQuillin, Ben, 2009. "The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 696-721, March.
  6. Guillaume Haeringer, 1998. "A new weight scheme for the Shapley value," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9807001, EconWPA.
  7. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2005. "Efficient Bidding with Externalities," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 641.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  8. M. J. Albizuri & J. Arin & J. Rubio, 2005. "An Axiom System For A Value For Games In Partition Function Form," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(01), pages 63-72.
  9. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2001. "Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 274-294, October.
  10. Perez-Castrillo, D. & Wettstein, D., 1999. "Bidding for the Surplus: a Non-Cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value. ation," Papers, Tel Aviv 24-99, Tel Aviv.
  11. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2004. "Sharing the surplus: A just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities," Working Papers 119, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  12. Pham Do, K.H. & Norde, H.W., 2002. "The Shapley Value for Partition Function Form Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2002-4, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2010. "Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 177-184, March.
  2. Radzik, Tadeusz, 2012. "A new look at the role of players’ weights in the weighted Shapley value," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 223(2), pages 407-416.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:366. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bruno Guallar).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.