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An Extension of the Solidarity Value for Environments with Externalities

Author

Listed:
  • Julio Rodríguez-Segura

    (Facultad de Economa, UASLP, Consejo Estatal de Población (COESPO), San Luis Potosí, México)

  • Joss Sánchez-Pérez

    (Facultad de Economía, UASLP, Av. Pintores s/n, Col. B. del Estado 78213, San Luis Potosí, México)

Abstract

In this paper, we propose an axiomatic extension for the Solidarity value of Nowak and Radzik [1994] A solidarity value for n-person transferable utility games, Int. J. Game Theor. 23, 43–48] to the class of games with externalities. This value is characterized as the unique function that satisfies linearity, symmetry, efficiency and average nullity. In this context, we discuss a key subject of how to extend the concept of average marginal contribution to settings where externalities are present.

Suggested Citation

  • Julio Rodríguez-Segura & Joss Sánchez-Pérez, 2017. "An Extension of the Solidarity Value for Environments with Externalities," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(02), pages 1-12, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:19:y:2017:i:02:n:s0219198917500074
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198917500074
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    8. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2007. "Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 339-356, July.
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