A coalition formation value for games with externalities
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Michel Grabisch & Yukihiko Funaki, 2011. "A coalition formation value for games with externalities," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00344797, HAL.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Eyckmans, Johan & Finus, Michael & Mallozzi, Lina, 2011.
"A New Class of Welfare Maximizing Stable Sharing Rules for Partition Function Games with Externalities,"
2011/08, Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel, Faculteit Economie en Management.
- Eyckmans, Johan & Finus, Michael & Mallozziy, Lina, 2012. "A New Class of Welfare Maximizing Stable Sharing Rules for Partition Function Games with Externalities," Department of Economics Working Papers 32513, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
- repec:wsi:igtrxx:v:19:y:2017:i:02:n:s0219198917500074 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
KeywordsCoalition formation; games in partition function form; solution concept; Cournot oligopoly.;
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:b08076. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lucie Label). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cenp1fr.html .
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .