Dynamic Competition in Electricity Markets: Hydroelectric and Thermal Generation
AbstractWe study competition between hydro and thermal electricity generators that face uncertainty over demand and water flows where the hydro generator is constrained by water flows and the thermal generator by capacity. We compute the Feedback equilibrium for the in?nite horizon game and show that there can be strategic withholding of water by the hydro generator. When water inflow is relatively low, however, the hydro generator may use more water than efficient as it faces an inefficiently low shadow price of water in this case. The inefficiency of the market outcome is tempered by the capacity constraints: for a large range of possible thermal production capacities and water flow levels, welfare loss under the duopoly market structure is much less than would occur in the absence of water and capacity constraints.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers with number 1104.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Electricity markets; Electricity markets; Hydroelectricity; Imperfect Competition;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-04-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2011-04-30 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2011-04-30 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ENE-2011-04-30 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-REG-2011-04-30 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Thille, Henry, 2006. "Inventories, market structure, and price volatility," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(7), pages 1081-1104, July.
- Abdessalem Abbassi & Ahlem Dakhlaoui & Lota D.Tamini, 2014. "Risk Aversion and Dynamic Games Between Hydroelectric Operators under Uncertainty," Cahiers de recherche CREATE 2014-4, CREATE.
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