Metin Cosgel () (Economics Dept., The University of Connecticut.) Rasha Ahmed (Economics Dept., The University of Connecticut.) Thomas Miceli (Economics Dept., The University of Connecticut.)
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This paper studies the unique nature, institutional roots, and economic consequences of the ruler’s political power in Islamic History. An influential interest group in Islamic societies has been the legal community, whose power could range from being able to regulate the rulers to being entirely under their control. The struggle was over the provision of legal goods and services, the legal community gradually gaining control of the law in history and the rulers seeking to appropriate political power by controlling the legal community. The economic consequence of power was the ability to dictate the choice of tax bases and rates.
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Paper provided by Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. in its series Papers on Economics of Religion with number
08/02.
Find related papers by JEL classification: K3 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
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