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Budgetary Aspects Of Economic And Monetary Integration Inn Europe

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  • VAN DER PLOEG, F.

Abstract

This paper analyses some of the implications of the proposals of the Delors Committee for monetary and fiscal policies in Europe. The merits of an independent ESCB are discussed. We offer four reasons why, in the absence of European coordination of budgetary policies, the size of the public sector may be too small relative to the first-best outcome: first, with an independent central bank seigniorage revenues will only accrue through real growth, so that taxes must be raised and exhaustive public spending must be cut; second, an economic union means that spending by an individual treasury benefits the other treasuries, so that there is an inadequate provision of public goods; third, international competition drives tax rates down and leaves fewer funds for the public sector; fourth, an appreciation of the real exchange rate of Europe has the nature of a public good, hence the level of exhaustive public spending tends to be too low.
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  • Van Der Ploeg, F., 1990. "Budgetary Aspects Of Economic And Monetary Integration Inn Europe," Papers 9037, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:tilbur:9037
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    Cited by:

    1. Jakob De Haan & Jan Egbert Sturm, 1992. "The Case for Central Bank Independence," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 45(182), pages 305-327.
    2. Patrick Artus, 1992. "Passage à l'union économique et monétaire en Europe : effets sur la croissance et les politiques budgétaires," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 106(5), pages 123-137.
    3. Heinemann, Friedrich, 1994. "Verschuldungsanreize in der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion," ZEW Discussion Papers 94-02, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    4. Keuzenkamp, Hugo & van der Ploeg, Frederick, 1990. "Savings, Investment, Government Finance and the Current Account: The Dutch Experience," CEPR Discussion Papers 467, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Jacques Mélitz, 1991. "Brussels on a single money," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 323-336, October.

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