A Coasean Approach to Bank Resolution Policy in the Eurozone
AbstractThe Eurozone needs a bank resolution regime that can work across seventeen independent nations of diverse sizes with varying levels of financial development, limited fiscal coresponsibility, and with systemic instability induced by quick and low-cost deposit transfers across borders. We advocate a Coasean approach to bank resolution policy in the Eurozone, which emphasises clear and consistent contracts and makes explicit the public ownership of the externality costs of bank distress. A variety of resolution mechanisms are compared including bank debt holder bail-in, prompt corrective action, and contingent convertible bonds. We argue that the “dilute-in” of bank debt holders via contingent convertibility provides a clearer and simpler Coasean bargain for the Eurozone than the more conventional alternatives of debt holder bail-in or prompt corrective action.
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Date of creation: Dec 2012
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- Gregory Connor & Brian O'Kelly, 2012. "A Coasean Approach to Bank Resolution Policy in the Eurozone," Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series n233-12.pdf, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
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