Concocting Marketable Cocos
AbstractAdding contingently convertible debt securities, cocos, in an amount equal to about 3% of tangible assets to the financing mix of financial institutions is a promising reform idea. It would also be inexpensive for these institutions to issue cocos and thus to be prepared to recapitalize and to avert failure by rebuilding common equity and reducing leverage and debt overhang in a crisis. For cocos to become readily marketable, much work is needed on their standardization and optimal design. That basic design should include a trigger couched in a regulatory capital ratio referenced in Basel III. It should also include conversion terms setting the rate of increase in the number of shares equal to the rate of growth of the book value of common equity through conversion. This would prevent redistribution from existing to new shareholders, guarantee their equality of treatment, and protect the subordination hierarchy with non-cocos debt.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research in its series Working Papers with number 222011.
Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2011
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Contingent Convertibles; Cocos Design; Capital Ratios; Financial Reform; Basel III;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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