Coase, competition, and compensation
AbstractI show that the Pigovian solution to a simple externalities problem and a particular Coasian solution can be viewed as competitive equilibria from different initial endowments. I also describe the ``compensation mechanism,'' a mechanism that implements either the Coasian or Pigovian solution as the outcome of an economically natural bargaining game.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Japan and the World Economy.
Volume (Year): 7 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505557
Other versions of this item:
- D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
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