A new mechanism to implement the Lindahl equilibriums (In French)
AbstractThis paper presents a new economic mechanism, such that the associated game form implements Lindahl equilibria as Nash equilibria. Each player sends a 2-dimensional message, in order to tell his marginal propensity to pay and his demand for the public good. At a Nash equilibrium, the players directly and honestly reveal data defining a Lindahl equilibrium and the mechanism implements the corresponding allocation. In a quasi-linear economy, formalizing out-of-equilibrium behaviours of the players as a gradient process, the unique stationary point of this process is a Nash equilibrium of the game and it is shown to be globally stable.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée in its series Cahiers du GREThA with number 2009-09.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
Public good; Lindalh equilibrium; Economic mechanism;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-10-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2009-10-31 (Game Theory)
- NEP-PBE-2009-10-31 (Public Economics)
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