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The ‘Celtic Crisis’: Guarantees, transparency, and systemic liquidity risk

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  • König, Philipp
  • Anand, Kartik
  • Heinemann, Frank

Abstract

Bank liability guarantee schemes have traditionally been viewed as costless measures to shore up investor confidence and stave off bank runs. However, as the experience of some European countries, most notably Ireland, has demonstrated, the credibility and effectiveness of these guarantees is crucially intertwined with the sovereign's funding risks. Employing methods from the literature on global games, we develop a simple model to explore the functional co-dependence between the rollover risks of a bank and a government, which are connected through the government's guarantee of bank liabilities. We show the existence and uniqueness of the joint equilibrium and derive its comparative static properties. In solving for the optimal guarantee, we further show that its credibility may be improved through policies that promote balance sheet transparency. --

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Paper provided by Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association in its series Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order with number 79747.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79747

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Cited by:
  1. Friedrich Poeschel, 2013. "Assortative matching through signals," 2013 Papers, Job Market Papers ppo178, Job Market Papers.

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