Anonymous, neutral and reversal symmetric majority rules
AbstractIn the standard arrovian framework and under the assumptions that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders over the set of alternatives, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of anonymous, neutral and reversal symmetric rules and for the existence of anonymous, neutral, reversal symmetric majority rules
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Dipartimento di Matematica per le Decisioni, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze in its series DiMaD Working Papers with number 2013-05.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2013
Date of revision:
Social welfare function; anonymity; neutrality; reversal symmetry; majority; linear order; group theory;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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- Michele Gori & Daniela Bubboloni, 2013. "Anonymous and neutral majority rules," DiMaD Working Papers 2013-02, Dipartimento di Matematica per le Decisioni, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, revised Oct 2013.
- Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-36, May.
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