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Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences

Author

Listed:
  • Mostapha Diss

    (CRESE EA3190, Univ. Bourgogne Franche-Comté
    University Mohammed VI Polytechnic)

  • Michele Gori

    (Università degli Studi di Firenze)

Abstract

We characterize the positional social preference correspondences (spc) satisfying the qualified majority property for any given majority threshold. We also characterize the positional spcs satisfying the minimal majority property. We next evaluate the probability that the Borda, the plurality and the antiplurality spcs fulfil the two aforementioned properties under the Impartial and Anonymous Culture assumption in the presence of three and four alternatives for various sizes of the society. Our results show that the Borda spc is the positional spc which better behaves in relation with the qualified majority principle and the minimal majority principle.

Suggested Citation

  • Mostapha Diss & Michele Gori, 2022. "Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 92(2), pages 319-347, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:92:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s11238-021-09828-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-021-09828-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    11. Abdelhalim El Ouafdi & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui, 2021. "IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin (ed.), Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, pages 399-416, Springer.
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    13. Abdelhalim El Ouafdi & Dominique Lepelley & Hatem Smaoui, 2020. "Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 88(2), pages 205-229, March.
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    19. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2020. "On Some k -scoring Rules for Committee Elections: Agreement and Condorcet Principle," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(5), pages 699-725.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social preference correspondence; Positional rule; Qualified majority; Probability; Condorcet consistency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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