Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Illiquidity in the interbank payment system following wide-scale disruptions

Contents:

Author Info

  • Morten L. Bech
  • Rod Garratt

Abstract

We show how the interbank payment system can become illiquid following wide-scale disruptions. Two forces are at play in such disruptions-operational problems and changes in participants' behavior. We model the interbank payment system as an n-player game and utilize the concept of a potential function to describe the process by which one of multiple equilibria emerges after a wide-scale disruption. If the disruption is large enough, hits a key geographic area, or hits a "too-big-to-fail" participant, then the coordination of payment processing can break down, and central bank intervention might be required to reestablish the socially efficient equilibrium. We also explore how the network topology of the underlying payment flow among banks affects the resiliency of coordination. The paper provides a theoretical framework to analyze the effects of events such as the September 11 attacks.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr239.html
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr239.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its series Staff Reports with number 239.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:239

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 33 Liberty Street, New York, NY 10045-0001
Email:
Web page: http://www.newyorkfed.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.ny.frb.org/rmaghome/staff_rp/

Related research

Keywords: Payment systems ; Banks and banking ; Game theory ; Banks and banking; Central;

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Charles M. Kahn & James McAndrews & William Roberds, 1999. "Settlement risk under gross and net settlement," Staff Reports 86, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  2. R. Aumann, 2010. "Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality," Levine's Bibliography 513, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Bech, Morten L. & Garratt, Rod, 2001. "The Intraday Liquidity Management Game," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt0m6035wg, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  4. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1998. "Financial Contagion Journal of Political Economy," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 98-31, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  5. R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
  6. Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, Leo K. & Zhao, Jinhua, 2000. "Environmental Remedies: An Incomplete Information Aggregation Game," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt9z00731z, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
  7. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
  8. Stacy Panigay Coleman, 2002. "The evolution of the Federal Reserve's intraday credit policies," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Feb, pages 67-84.
  9. James J. McAndrews & Simon M. Potter, 2002. "Liquidity effects of the events of September 11, 2001," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Nov, pages 59-79.
  10. James McAndrews & Samira Rajan, 2000. "The timing and funding of Fedwire funds transfers," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Jul, pages 17-32.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Morten Bech & James T. E. Chapman & Rod Garratt, 2008. "Which Bank is the "Central" Bank? An Application of Markov Theory to the Canadian Large Value Transfer System," Working Papers 08-42, Bank of Canada.
  2. Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Ted Temzelides, 2007. "A dynamic model of the payment system," Working Papers 07-22, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  3. Ronald Heijmans & Richard Heuver, 2011. "Is this bank ill? The diagnosis of doctor TARGET2," DNB Working Papers 316, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  4. Clara Lia Machado & Carlos León & Miguel Sarmiento & Orlando Chipatecua, 2010. "Riesgo Sistémico y Estabilidad del Sistema de Pagos de Alto Valor en Colombia: Análisis bajo Topología de Redes y Simulación de Pagos," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 007669, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
  5. Marc Pr�pper & Iman van Lelyveld & Ronald Heijmans, 2008. "Towards a Network Description of Interbank Payment Flows," DNB Working Papers 177, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  6. Galbiati, Marco & Soramäki, Kimmo, 2011. "An agent-based model of payment systems," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 859-875, June.
  7. Morten L. Bech & Antoine Martin & James McAndrews, 2012. "Settlement liquidity and monetary policy implementation—lessons from the financial crisis," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Mar, pages 3-20.
  8. Bech, Morten L. & Chapman, James T.E. & Garratt, Rodney J., 2010. "Which bank is the "central" bank?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 352-363, April.
  9. Upper, Christian, 2011. "Simulation methods to assess the danger of contagion in interbank markets," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 111-125, August.
  10. Ronald Heijmans & Richard Heuver & Clement Levallois & Iman van Lelyveld, 2014. "Dynamic visualization of large transaction networks: the daily Dutch overnight money market," DNB Working Papers 418, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:239. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Amy Farber).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.