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Gates, Fees, and Preemptive Runs

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Abstract

In the academic literature on banks, ?suspension of convertibility??that is, preventing the exchange of deposits at par for cash?has traditionally been seen as a potential means of preventing economically damaging bank runs. In this post, however, we show that giving a financial intermediary (FI) the option to suspend convertibility may ultimately increase the risk of runs by causing preemptive runs. That is, investors who face potential restrictions on their future access to cash may run when they anticipate that such restrictions may be imposed.

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  • Marco Cipriani & Antoine Martin & Patrick E. McCabe & Bruno Parigi, 2014. "Gates, Fees, and Preemptive Runs," Liberty Street Economics 20140818, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednls:86963
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gorton, Gary B., 2012. "Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don't See Them Coming," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199922901.
    2. Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2009. "Bank Runs and Institutions: The Perils of Intervention," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1588-1607, September.
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    4. Gennaioli, Nicola & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2012. "Neglected risks, financial innovation, and financial fragility," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(3), pages 452-468.
    5. Engineer, Merwan, 1989. "Bank runs and the suspension of deposit convertibility," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 443-454, November.
    6. James Peck & Karl Shell, 2003. "Equilibrium Bank Runs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 103-123, February.
    7. Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 2010. "Financial Innovation and Financial Fragility," Working Papers 2010.114, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    8. Gorton, Gary, 1985. "Bank suspension of convertibility," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 177-193, March.
    9. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2010. "Banking panics and policy responses," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(4), pages 404-419, May.
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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. 'An Open Letter to Bill McNabb, CEO of Vanguard Group'
      by Mark Thoma in Economist's View on 2015-05-11 16:06:21
    2. An Open Letter to Bill McNabb, CEO of Vanguard Group
      by Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz in Money, Banking and Financial Markets on 2015-05-11 17:26:54

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    Cited by:

    1. Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf, 2016. "Deposit insurance and bank liquidation without commitment: Can we sleep well?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(2), pages 365-392, February.
    2. Josh Frost & Lorie Logan & Antoine Martin & Patrick E. McCabe & Fabio M. Natalucci & Julie Remache, 2015. "Overnight RRP Operations as a Monetary Policy Tool: Some Design Considerations," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-10, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. Jeffrey N. Gordon, 2014. "The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(S2), pages 351-378.
    4. Nathan Foley-Fisher & Borghan Narajabad & Stéphane Verani, 2020. "Self-Fulfilling Runs: Evidence from the US Life Insurance Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(9), pages 3520-3569.
    5. Schilling, Linda, 2023. "Smooth versus Harsh Regulatory Interventions and Policy Equivalence," MPRA Paper 116612, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Marco Cipriani & Gabriele La Spada, 2020. "Sophisticated and Unsophisticated Runs," Staff Reports 956, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    7. Kenechukwu E. Anadu & Siobhan Sanders, 2021. "Money Market Mutual Funds: Runs, Emergency Liquidity Facilities, and Potential Reforms," Supervisory Research and Analysis Notes, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue 03, pages 1-12, May.
    8. Dunhong Jin & Marcin Kacperczyk & Bige Kahraman & Felix Suntheim, 2022. "Swing Pricing and Fragility in Open-End Mutual Funds," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(1), pages 1-50.
    9. Roy Havemann, 2018. "Can creditor bail-in trigger contagion? The experience of an emerging market," Working Papers 755, Economic Research Southern Africa.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Preemptive Runs; Gates; Fees;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services

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