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Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core

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  • Dinko Dimitrov

    (Bielefeld University)

  • Claus-Jochen Haake

    (Bielefeld University)

Abstract

We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of coalitional worth. Using a multiplicative composite solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict core of the game is nonempty.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2006.72.

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Date of creation: May 2006
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.72

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Keywords: Coalition Formation; Paradox of Smaller Coalitions; Semistrict Core; Simple Games; Winning Coalitions;

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  1. Joseph Farrell and Suzanne Scotchmer., 1986. "Partnerships," Economics Working Papers 8616, University of California at Berkeley.
  2. James M. Snyder Jr. & Michael M. Ting & Stephen Ansolabehere, 2005. "Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 981-1004, September.
  3. Dinko Dimitrov, 2006. "Top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(12), pages 1-6.
  4. Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2005. "Government versus opposition: Who should be who in the 16th German Bundestag?," Working Papers 375, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  5. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
  6. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
  7. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1983. "On Weighted Shapley Values," Discussion Papers 602, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Slikker, Marco, 2001. "Coalition Formation and Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 436-448, November.
  9. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2006:i:12:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2006. "An axiomatic approach to composite solutions," Working Papers 385, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  11. Georg Kirchsteiger & Clemens Puppe, 1997. "On the formation of political coalitions," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5915, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  12. Dinko Dimitrov, 2005. "On top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability," Working Papers 377, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
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