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Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control

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Author Info
Baris Ciftci () (Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University)
Dinko Dimitrov () (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

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Abstract

In this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players. preferences over coalitions are induced by a semi-value of a monotonic simple game with veto control. We consider partitions of the player set in which the winning coalition contains the union of all minimal winning coalitions, and show that each of these partitions belongs to the strict core of the hedonic game. Exactly such coalition structures constitute the strict core when the simple game is symmetric. Provided that the veto player set is not a winning coalition in a symmetric simple game, then the partition containing the grand coalition is the unique strictly core stable coalition structure.

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File URL: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/papers/files/imw-wp-384.pdf
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File Function: First version, 2006
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number 384.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:384

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Related research
Keywords: Banzhaf value; hedonic game; semi-value; Shapley value; simple game; strict core;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2006. "Government versus Opposition: Who Should be Who in the 16th German Bundestag?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 89(2), pages 115-128, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Sergiu Hart, 2006. "Shapley Value," Discussion Paper Series dp421, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
  4. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 2002. "Variations on the shapley value," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 54, pages 2055-2076 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Pradeep Dubey & Abraham Neyman & Robert J. Weber, 1979. "Value Theory without Efficiency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 513, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ciftci, Baris & Borm, Peter & Hamers, Herbert, 2006. "Population monotonic paths schemes for simple games," Discussion Paper 113, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  7. Sprumont, Yves, 1990. "Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 378-394, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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