Government versus Opposition: Who Should be Who in the 16th German Bundestag?
AbstractWe model the process of coalition formation in the 16th German Bundestag as a hedonic coalition formation game. In order to induce players' preferences in the game we apply the Shapley value of the simple game describing all winning coalitions in the Bundestag. Using different stability notions for hedonic games we prove that the "most" stable government is formed by the Union Parties together with the Social Democratic Party.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 89 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=108909
coalition formation; Shapley value; simple games; winning coalitions; D72; C71;
Other versions of this item:
- Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2005. "Government versus opposition: Who should be who in the 16th German Bundestag?," Working Papers 375, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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2006.10, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Shao Chin Sung & Dinko Dimitrov, 2005. "A taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games," Working Papers 373, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- Ciftci, B.B. & Dimitrov, D.A., 2006.
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2006-114, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Baris Ciftci & Dinko Dimitrov, 2006. "Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control," Working Papers 384, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2006.
"Coalition formation in simple games: The semistrict core,"
378, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2006. "Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core," Working Papers 2006.72, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Dinko Dimitrov, 2006. "Top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(12), pages 1-6.
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"A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions,"
386, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- Dominik Karos, 2013. "Bargaining and Power," Working Papers 2013.63, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Dominik Karos, 2013. "Coalition Formation in General Apex Games," Economics Series Working Papers 680, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2006:i:12:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
- Dominik Karos, 2012. "Coalition Formation in Generalized Apex Games," Working Papers 2012.38, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Dimitrov, Dinko & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2008. "Stable governments and the semistrict core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 460-475, March.
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