Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

A new model of coalition formation


Author Info

  • Agnieszka Rusinowska


  • Harrie de Swart


  • Jan-Willem van der Rijt



In this paper, a new model of multidimensional coalition formation in politics is presented. The model provides an opportunity to analyze a number of different kinds of issues at the same time. A policy space consists of a finite number of independent sub-spaces (policy spaces on certain issues), which can be multidimensional. Any policy sub-space on a certain sub-issue can be either a Euclidean space or (in principle) any other type of set. So, it is possible to include issues which cannot be represented by a Euclidean space or a fixed sum. A government is defined as a pair consisting of a majority coalition and a policy supported by this coalition. The majority coalition may be not minimal winning. Each party is allowed to give one qualification to a policy on a certain issue and to a majority coalition: desirable of a certain degree, acceptable, or unacceptable. By representing party preferences the way we do, we can include both rent-seeking and idealistic motivations in one consistent model. We define the value of a policy/coalition/government to a party, and the notions of a feasible and stable policy/coalition/government. The model uses party preferences in order to predict government policy. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a stable government are investigated. Moreover, some alternative definitions of a ‘stable’ government are introduced, and relations between these definitions and the chosen definition of a stable government are established. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2005

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL:
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 24 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (09)
Pages: 129-154

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:24:y:2005:i:1:p:129-154

Contact details of provider:
Web page:

Order Information:

Related research



No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.


Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Tangian, Andranik S., 2013. "2013 election to German Bundestag from the viewpoint of direct democracy," WSI Discussion Papers 186, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut (WSI), Hans-Böckler-Stiftung.
  2. Carlo Carraro & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2007. "Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty," Working Papers 2007_12, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
  3. Berghammer, Rudolf & Rusinowska, Agnieszka & de Swart, Harrie, 2013. "Computing tournament solutions using relation algebra and RelView," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 226(3), pages 636-645.
  4. Andranik Tangian, 2013. "German parliamentary elections 2009 from the viewpoint of direct democracy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 833-869, March.
  5. Harrie De Swart & Patrik Eklund & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2008. "A consensus model of political decision-making," Post-Print halshs-00283200, HAL.
  6. Vito Fragnelli, 2009. "The Propensity to Disruption for Evaluating a Parliament," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 3(3), pages 243-253, October.
  7. Tangian, Andranik S., 2006. "German parliamentary elections 2005 in the mirror of party manifestos," WSI Discussion Papers 139E, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut (WSI), Hans-Böckler-Stiftung.
  8. Tangian, Andranik S., 2010. "Representativeness of German parties and trade unions with regard to public opinion," WSI Discussion Papers 173, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut (WSI), Hans-Böckler-Stiftung.
  9. Tangian, Andranik S., 2013. "Decision making in politics and economics: 5. 2013 election to German Bundestag and direct democracy," Working Paper Series in Economics 49, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Business Engineering.
  10. Andranik Tangian, 2006. "Evaluation of Parties and Coalitions After Parliamentary Elections," Working Papers 2006.76, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.


This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.


Access and download statistics


When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:24:y:2005:i:1:p:129-154. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.