A consensus model of political decision-making
AbstractIn this paper, a model of political consensus is introduced. Parties try to reach consensus in forming a government. A government is deﬁned as a pair consisting of a winning coalition and a policy supported by this coalition, where a policy consists of policies on given issues. A party evaluates all governments the party belongs to with respect to some criteria. We allow the criteria to be of unequal importance to a party. These criteria concern winning coalitions and policy issues. Parties may be advised to adjust their preferences, i.e., to change their evaluation concerning some government(s) or/and the importance of the criteria, in order to obtain a better political consensus.
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Date of creation: 2008
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Publication status: Published, Annals of Operations Research, 2008, 158, 1, pp. 5-20
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consensus reaching; consensus degree; government; coalition; policy;
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