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Government versus opposition: Who should be who in the 16th German Bundestag?

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Author Info
Dinko Dimitrov () (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)
Claus-Jochen Haake () (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

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Abstract

We model the process of coalition formation in the 16th German Bundestag as a hedonic coalition formation game. In order to induce players' preferences in the game we apply the Shapley value of the simple game describing all winning coalitions in the Bundestag. Using different stability notions for hedonic games we prove that the "most" stable government is formed by the Union Parties together with the Social Democratic Party.

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File URL: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/papers/files/imw-wp-375.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2005
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number 375.

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Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:375

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Postal: Postfach 10 01 31, 33501 Bielefeld
Web page: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/
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Related research
Keywords: coalition formation; Shapley value; simple games; winning coalitions;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Shao Chin Sung & Dinko Dimitrov, 2005. "A taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games," Working Papers 373, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2006. "Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core," Working Papers 2006.72, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2006. "A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions," Working Papers 386, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Baris Ciftci & Dinko Dimitrov, 2006. "Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control," Working Papers 384, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Dinko Dimitrov, 2006. "Top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(12), pages 1-6. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.

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