Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria
AbstractWe provide an existence and a uniqueness result for coalitional equilibria of a game in strategic form. Both results are illustrated for a public good game and a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly game.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2005.23.
Date of creation: Feb 2005
Date of revision:
Existence and uniqueness of coalitional equilibrium; Game in strategic form;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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