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The Larger the Better? The Role of Interest-Group Size in Legislative Lobbying

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    Abstract

    We develop a model of legislative lobbying where policy proposals are endogenous. We show that a policy proposer with preferences tilted towards one lobby may be induced by an increase in that interest group's size to propose policies geared towards the opposing lobby. Hence, a larger lobby size can have adverse effects on policy outcomes for this same lobby. This provides another rationale as to why some interests do not organize. Moreover, we find that a second-mover advantage in Groseclose and Snyder (1996)-type lobbying models with exogenous policy proposals can turn into a second-mover disadvantage when the proposal is endogenous.

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    File URL: http://www.cer.ethz.ch/research/WP-10-126.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich in its series CER-ETH Economics working paper series with number 10/126.

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    Length: 52 pages
    Date of creation: Mar 2010
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    Handle: RePEc:eth:wpswif:10-126

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    Keywords: legislative lobbying; vote buying; legislatures; interest groups; political economy;

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    1. Le Breton, Michel & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2007. "Sequential Legislative Lobbying under Political Certainty," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 492, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    2. Elhanan Helpman & Torsten Persson, 1998. "Lobbying and Legistlative Bargaining," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research 1837, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    3. Le Breton, Michel & Sudhölter, Peter & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2009. "Sequential legislative lobbying," Discussion Papers of Business and Economics 8/2009, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark.
    4. Roger B. Myerson & Daniel Diermeier, 1999. "Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1182-1196, December.
    5. Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2000. "Lobbying Legislatures," Working Papers, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics 07-2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
    6. Dal Bo, E., 2000. "Bribing Voters," Economics Series Working Papers 9939, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    7. Dekel, Eddie & Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 2009. "Vote Buying: Legislatures and Lobbying," International Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, now publishers, vol. 4(2), pages 103-128, July.
    8. David P. Baron, 2006. "Competitive Lobbying and Supermajorities in a Majority-rule Institution," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(4), pages 607-642, December.
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