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Competitive Lobbying and Supermajorities in a Majority-rule Institution

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  • David P. Baron
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    Abstract

    This paper presents a complete information model of competitive lobbying in a majority-rule institution where lobbying consists of providing politically-valuable resources to legislators. Legislators have three roles. First, they act as allies or opponents in deciding whether to consider a lobbyist's offer. Second, they act as agenda-setters in deciding whether to bring a policy alternative to a vote. Third, they vote on the agenda. The stationary equilibria include minimal majorities and supermajorities and involve unilateral, counteractive and preemptive lobbying. Supermajorities are recruited either to influence agenda formation or to preempt the opposing lobbyist. Copyright The editors of the "Scandinavian Journal of Economics" 2006 .

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

    Volume (Year): 108 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 607-642

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:108:y:2006:i:4:p:607-642

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    Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442

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    Cited by:
    1. Klingelhöfer, Jan, 2013. "Lobbying and Elections," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79722, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Henry, Emeric, 2008. "The informational role of supermajorities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 2225-2239, October.
    3. Krehbiel, Keith & Meirowitz, Adam & Wiseman, Alan E., 2013. "A Theory of Competitive Partisan Lawmaking," Research Papers 2136, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    4. Gil S. Epstein & Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2012. "The Efficacy and Efforts of Interest Groups in Post Elections Policy Formation," CESifo Working Paper Series 4009, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Aytimur, Refik Emre, 2013. "Importance of status quo when lobbying a coalition government," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 162, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    6. David Baron & Alexander Hirsch, 2012. "Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 639-681, April.
    7. Maik T. Schneider, 2010. "The Larger the Better? The Role of Interest-Group Size in Legislative Lobbying," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 10/126, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.

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