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Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy

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  • David Baron

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  • Alexander Hirsch

    ()

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    Abstract

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-011-0628-4
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

    Volume (Year): 49 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 3 (April)
    Pages: 639-681

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:49:y:2012:i:3:p:639-681

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    Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm

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    Related research

    Keywords: Lobbying; Public policy; Proto-coalitions; Common agency; Gridlock; D72; H11;

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    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Marco Battaglini & Thomas Palfrey, 2007. "The Dynamics of Distributive Politics," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1451, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. Guillaume Fréchette & John Kagel & Massimo Morelli, 2012. "Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 779-800, April.
    3. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "A Structural Model of Government Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 27-70, January.
    4. David P. Baron, 2006. "Competitive Lobbying and Supermajorities in a Majority-rule Institution," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(4), pages 607-642, December.
    5. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2004. "Regularity of Pure Strategy Equilibrium Points in a Class of Bargaining Games," Wallis Working Papers, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy WP37, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
    6. David P. Baron & Daniel Diermeier, 2001. "Elections, Governments, And Parliaments In Proportional Representation Systems," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 116(3), pages 933-967, August.
    7. Dekel, Eddie & Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 2009. "Vote Buying: Legislatures and Lobbying," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 4(2), pages 103-128, July.
    8. Marc Debus, 2009. "Pre-electoral commitments and government formation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 45-64, January.
    9. Diermeier, Daniel & Eraslan, Hulya & Merlo, Antonio, 2002. "Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 893-907, May.
    10. Elhanan Helpman & Torsten Persson, 1998. "Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining," NBER Working Papers 6589, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Daniel Seidmann & Eyal Winter & Elan Pavlov, 2007. "The Formateurs’ Role in Government Formation," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 427-445, June.
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    Cited by:
    1. Aytimur, Refik Emre, 2013. "Importance of status quo when lobbying a coalition government," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 162, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    2. Francesco Squintani, 2012. "Introduction to the symposium in political economy," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 513-519, April.

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