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Nominations for Sale

Author

Listed:
  • Silvia Console-Battilana

    (Stanford University, silviacb@stanford.edu)

  • Kenneth A. Shepsle

    (Institute for Quantitative Social Science at Harvard University, kshepsle@iq.harvard.edu)

Abstract

Models of nomination politics in the USA often find ‘gridlock’ in equilibrium because of the supermajority requirement in the Senate for the confirmation of presidential nominees. A blocking coalition often prefers to defeat any nominee. Yet empirically nominations are successful. In the present article we explore the possibility that senators can be induced to vote contrary to their nominal (gridlock-producing) preferences through contributions from the president and/or lobbyists, thus breaking the gridlock and confirming the nominee. We model contributions by the president and lobbyists according to whether payment schedules are conditioned on the entire voting profile, the vote of a senator, or the outcome. We analyze several extensions to our baseline approach, including the possibility that lobbyists may find it more productive to offer inducements to the president in order to affect his proposal behavior, rather than trying to induce senators to vote for or against a given nominee.

Suggested Citation

  • Silvia Console-Battilana & Kenneth A. Shepsle, 2009. "Nominations for Sale," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 21(4), pages 413-449, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:21:y:2009:i:4:p:413-449
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629809339832
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Keith Krehbiel, 2007. "Partisan Roll Rates in a Nonpartisan Legislature," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(1), pages 1-23, April.
    2. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    3. Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2008. "Vote Buying: General Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 351-380, April.
    4. Snyder, Susan K & Weingast, Barry R, 2000. "The American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 269-305, October.
    5. James M. Snyder, 1991. "On Buying Legislatures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(2), pages 93-109, July.
    6. Keith Krehbiel, 2007. "Supreme Court Appointments as a Move‐the‐Median Game," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(2), pages 231-240, April.
    7. David P. Baron, 2006. "Competitive Lobbying and Supermajorities in a Majority‐rule Institution," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(4), pages 607-642, December.
    8. Silvia Console Battilana, 2007. "Uncovered Power: External Agenda Setting, Sophisticated Voting, and Transnational Lobbying," CESifo Working Paper Series 2138, CESifo.
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    Cited by:

    1. Matthias Dahm & Amihai Glazer, 2012. "How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose," Working Papers 111211, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    2. Krehbiel, Keith & Meirowitz, Adam & Wiseman, Alan E., 2013. "A Theory of Competitive Partisan Lawmaking," Research Papers 2136, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    3. Matthias Dahm & Amihai Glazer, 2012. "How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose," Working Papers 111211, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    4. Dahm, Matthias & Glazer, Amihai, 2015. "A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 465-480.

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