Should Owners of Firms Delegate Long-run Decisions?
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Cited by:
- Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2008. "Do Firms' Owners Delegate both Short-Run and Long-Run Decisions to Their Managers in Equilibrium?," Working Papers 0815, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
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Keywords
managerial incentives; strategic delegation; product differentiation;All these keywords.
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