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Sub-federal administrative regulation of entry in Russia

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Author Info
Kolomak Evgeniya ()
Abstract

The project assesses the sub-federal regulation of market entry around Russian regions by addressing two problems: what are the consequences of the regulation and what determines the variation of the market entry regulation among the regions. Assumptions of public interest regulation and public choice theories are tested. Empirical base of the project is the constructed data set, describing the administrative regulation of entry by start-up companies in Russian regions.

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Paper provided by EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS in its series EERC Working Paper Series with number 07-03e.

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Date of creation: 10 May 2007
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Handle: RePEc:eer:wpalle:07-03e

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Postal: EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS, 47, Nakhimovsky pr-t, suite 919, Moscow, 117418 Russia
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Daron Acemoglu & Thierry Verdier, 2000. "The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 194-211, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "The Regulation Of Entry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(1), pages 1-37, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Phyllis Dininio & Robert W. Orttung, 2004. "Explaining Patterns of Corruption in the Russian Regions," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 727, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
  5. Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-81, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.


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