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Vertical Integration and Sabotage in Regulated Industries

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Author Info
Alvaro Bustos
Alexander Galetovic ()

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Abstract

An essential facility produces “access,” an essential input used by a competitive downstream industry. The access charge is regulated. The essential facility can vertically integrate into the downstream segment and sabotage rivals increasing their costs. We systematically study the vertical integration decision and the optimal level of sabotage. Contrary to most of the literature, we allow for free entry into the downstream segment, so that prices equal long-run average costs. We find the following: First, sabotage does not pay when diseconomies of scope are large, or the subsidiary’s market share is small. Second, when sabotage pays, and the subsidiary coexists with rivals in equilibrium, optimal sabotage increases with the subsidiary’s market share and scope economies. On the other hand, when the essential facility optimally sabotages to exclude rivals, the intensity of sabotage falls with economies of scope. Third, unless the subsidiary is implausibly more efficient than independent firms, vertical integration never benefits consumers.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile in its series Documentos de Trabajo with number 164.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:edj:ceauch:164

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  1. Alexander Galetovic, 2003. "Integración Vertical en el Sector Eléctrico: Una guía para el usuario (Vertical integration in the electricity sector)," Documentos de Trabajo 158, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. [Downloadable!]
  2. Alexandra Lai & Nikil Chande & Sean O'Connor, 2006. "Credit in a Tiered Payments System," Working Papers 06-36, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
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  3. David Sappington & Dennis Weisman, 2005. "Self-Sabotage," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 155-175, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. David Mandy & David E. M. Sappington, 2004. "Incentives for Sabotage in Vertically Related Industries," Working Papers 0404, Department of Economics, University of Missouri, revised 16 Dec 2004. [Downloadable!]
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  5. David Sappington, 2005. "Regulating Service Quality: A Survey," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 123-154, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-10.


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