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Regulation and Third-Party Discrimination in the German Electricity Supply Industry

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  • Gert Brunekreeft

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  • Gert Brunekreeft, 2002. "Regulation and Third-Party Discrimination in the German Electricity Supply Industry," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 203-220, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:13:y:2002:i:3:p:203-220
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1014718416616
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, 1995. "Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the Efficient Component Pricing Rule?," Working Papers 95-04, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    2. Riechmann, Christoph, 2000. "Strategic pricing of grid access under partial price-caps -- electricity distribution in England and Wales," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 187-207, April.
    3. Baumol, W, & Ordover, J. & Willig, R., 1996. "Parity Pricing and Its Critics: Necessary Condition for Efficiency in Provision of Bottleneck Services to Competitors," Working Papers 96-33, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    4. Weisman, Dennis L, 1995. "Regulation and the Vertically Integrated Firm: The Case of RBOC Entry into Interlata Long Distance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 249-266, November.
    5. Mandy, David M, 2000. "Killing the Goose That May Have Laid the Golden Egg: Only the Data Know Whether Sabotage Pays," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 157-172, March.
    6. Sibley, David S. & Weisman, Dennis L., 1998. "Raising rivals' costs: The entry of an upstream monopolist into downstream markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 451-470, December.
    7. Brunekreeft, Gert, 2001. "Regulation and third-party discrimination in vertically related markets: The case of German electricity," Discussion Papers 74 [rev.], University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    8. David M Newbery, 2002. "Regulating Unbundled Network Utilities," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 33(1), pages 23-41.
    9. Brunekreeft, Gert & Keller, Katja, 2000. "The electricity supply industry in Germany: market power or power of the market?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 15-29, March.
    10. Allen, Bruce T, 1971. "Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure: The Case of Cement and Concrete," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(1), pages 251-274, April.
    11. Beard, T Randolph & Kaserman, David L & Mayo, John W, 2001. "Regulation, Vertical Integration and Sabotage," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(3), pages 319-333, September.
    12. Reiffen, David & Schumann, Laurence & Ward, Michael R, 2000. "Discriminatory Dealing with Downstream Competitors: Evidence from the Cellular Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 253-286, September.
    13. Economides, Nicholas, 1998. "The incentive for non-price discrimination by an input monopolist," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 271-284, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Klaus Heine, 2013. "Inside the black box: incentive regulation and incentive channeling on energy markets," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 17(1), pages 157-186, February.
    2. Gert Brunekreeft, 2004. "Regulatory Threat in Vertically Related Markets: The Case of German Electricity," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 285-305, May.
    3. Adrien de Hauteclocque & Frédéric Marty & Julien Pillot, 2011. "The Essential Facilities Doctrine in European Competition Policy: The Case of the Energy Sector," Chapters, in: Jean-Michel Glachant & Dominique Finon & Adrien de Hauteclocque (ed.), Competition, Contracts and Electricity Markets, chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Schmidtchen, Dieter & Bier, Christoph, 2006. "Netznutzungsentgelte als Wettbewerbshindernis? Diskriminierungsanreize und Regulierung in liberalisierten Strommärkten: Eine spieltheoretische Analyse," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2006-05 [rev.], Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    5. Schmidtchen, Dieter & Bier, Christoph, 2005. "Killing the goose that may have laid the golden egg? The incentives to discriminate and the regulation of access charges in the German electricity supply industry," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2005-07, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    6. Bier, Christoph & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2006. ""Golden-Gans"-Effekt, Preisdiskriminierungsgefahr und die Regulierung von Netznutzungsentgelten," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2006-01, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    7. Gert Brunekreeft & David Newbery, 2006. "Should merchant transmission investment be subject to a must-offer provision?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 233-260, November.
    8. Gert Brunekreeft & Mika Goto & Roland Meyer & Masahiro Maruyama & Toru Hattori, 2014. "Unbundling of Electricity Transmission System Operators in Germany – An Experience Report," Bremen Energy Working Papers 0016, Bremen Energy Research.
    9. Schmidtchen, Dieter & Bier, Christoph, 2006. "Netznutzungsentgelte als Wettbewerbshindernis? Diskriminierungsanreize und Regulierung in liberalisierten Strommärkten: Eine spieltheoretische Analyse," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2006-05, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    10. Brunekreeft, G., 2002. "Regulatory Threat in Vertically Related Markets; The Case of German Electricity," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0228, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    11. Dieter Schmidtchen & Christoph Bier, "undated". "Netznutzungsentgelte als Wettbewerbshindernis? Diskriminierungsanreize und Regulierung in liberalisierten Strommärkten – Eine spieltheoretische Analyse

      The Access Pricing Problem: Incentives      ," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1158, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    12. Brunekreeft, Gert, 2005. "Regulatory issues in merchant transmission investment," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 175-186, June.
    13. Jean-Michel Glachant & Dominique Finon & Adrien de Hauteclocque (ed.), 2011. "Competition, Contracts and Electricity Markets," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14165.
    14. Newbery, David M., 2001. "Economic reform in Europe: integrating and liberalizing the market for services," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 85-97, June.
    15. Dieter Schmidtchen & Christoph Bier, "undated". "Killing the Goose That May Have Laid the Golden Egg?," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2005-1-1123, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    16. Weigt, Hannes, 2009. "A Review of Liberalization and Modeling of Electricity Markets," MPRA Paper 65651, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Muller, Chr. & Wienken, W., 2004. "Measuring the degree of economic opening in the German electricity market," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 283-290, December.
    18. Brunekreeft, G. & Bauknecht, D., 2005. "Energy policy and investment in the German power market," Discussion Paper 2005-031, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    19. Jamasb, T. & Pollitt, M., 2004. "Electricity Market Reform in the European Union: Review of progress towards liberalisation and integration," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0471, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    20. Brunekreeft, G. & Twelemann, S., 2005. "Regulation, Competition and Investment in the German Electricity Market: RegTP or REGTP," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0501, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    21. Eva Jansson, 0. "Deregulation, property rights, and legal system," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-25.
    22. Nepal, Rabindra & Jamasb, Tooraj, 2012. "Reforming small electricity systems under political instability: The case of Nepal," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 242-251.

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