Regulation in Vertically-Related Industries: Myths, Facts, and Policy
AbstractThis paper explains why conclusions that appear to be “facts” can truly be “myths” in industries like today’s telecommunications industry, where key suppliers operate in multiple vertical stages of production. The paper explains, for example, why an entrant’s decision to make or buy critical production inputs may be largely insensitive to the price of these inputs. It also reviews why a vertically-integrated producer (VIP) may prefer to assist, rather than disadvantage, retail rivals, and why a VIP may be disadvantaging rivals even when it provides them with the same wholesale service quality that it provides to its own retail affiliate. Copyright Springer 2006
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Industrial Organization.
Volume (Year): 28 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100336
regulatory policy; vertically-related industries; myths vs. facts; L51; L43; L22;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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