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„Golden-Gans“-Effekt, Preisdiskriminierungsgefahr und die Regulierung von Netznutzungsentgelten

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Author Info
Christoph Bier (Uni-Saarland - Center for the Study of Law and Economics)
Dieter Schmidtchen (Universität des Saarlandes)
Abstract

In dem Paper wird untersucht, wann ein vertikal integrierter Netzbetreiber einen Anreiz hat, durch Fordern hoher Netznutzungsentgelte den Wettbewerb im nachgelagerten Produktmarkt zu beschränken. Außerdem wird geprüft, ob und wie eine kostenorientierte Regulierung der Netznutzungsentgelte den Wettbewerb im nachgelagerten Produkt fördern kann. Es werden zwei Typen von Gleichgewichten identifiziert - markteintrittsverhindernde und markteintrittsermöglichende. Markteintrittsverhindernde Gleichgewichte existieren im unregulierten Spiel, wenn der vertikal integrierte Monopolist einen Kostenvorteil gegenüber Konkurrenten besitzt. Hat er dagegen einen Kostennachteil, dann fördert er den Markteintritt. Überraschenderweise gilt für beide Gleichgewichte, daß eine kostenorientierte Regulierung der Netznutzungsentgelte den Wettbewerb fördern kann aber nicht muß.

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Paper provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its series German Working Papers in Law and Economics with number 2006-1-1137.

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Handle: RePEc:bep:dewple:2006-1-1137

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Related research
Keywords: Strommarkt; Netznutzungsentgelte; Preisdiskriminierung; „essential facility”; „raising rivals’ costs“; Regulierung;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L - Industrial Organization
L - Industrial Organization
L - Industrial Organization

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References listed on IDEAS
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