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Regulierung in vertikal verknüpften Märkten: Maximieren diskriminierungsfreie kostenorientierte Netznutzungsentgelte die gesellschaftliche Wohlfahrt?

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  • Bier, Christoph
  • Schmidtchen, Dieter
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    Abstract

    In diesem Paper werden die Wohlfahrtseffekte einer kostenorientierten Regulierung von Netznutzungsentgelten zur Schaffung fairen Wettbewerbs abgeleitet. Es wird gezeigt, daß eine solche Regulierung nur im Falle starker Kostenvorteile eines vertikal integrierten Netzbetreibers im Vergleich zu einem Marktneuling second-best wohlfahrtsoptimal ist. In allen anderen Fällen von Erzeugungskostenunterschieden ist eine Abweichung von den Kosten – je nach Parameterkonstellation – nach oben oder unten wohlfahrtsoptimal. Die generelle Botschaft ist, daß es keine einfache und allgemein optimale Regulierungsregel für die Praxis gibt. -- The purpose of the paper is to derive the welfare implications of a regulation of access charges for electricity grids taking the costs of transmission as a benchmark. It shows that a cost-based regulation is second-best optimal only if the incumbent is much more efficient in the downstream market than a downstream entrant. In all other cases an access charge deviating from the transmission costs is second-best optimal. There is no simple and generally applicable rule for the determination of second-best optimal access charges.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics in its series CSLE Discussion Paper Series with number 2006-02.

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    Date of creation: 2006
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200602

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    Keywords: Regulierung; Strommarkt; Netzzugangsentgelte; ?second-best?;

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    References

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    1. J-J. Laffont & J. Tirole, 1994. "Access Pricing and Competition," Working papers 95-11, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    2. Mandy, David M, 2000. "Killing the Goose That May Have Laid the Golden Egg: Only the Data Know Whether Sabotage Pays," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 157-72, March.
    3. Gianni De Fraja, . "Regulation and Access Pricing with Asymmetric Information," Discussion Papers 95/5, Department of Economics, University of York.
    4. Vickers, John, 1995. "Competition and Regulation in Vertically Related Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(1), pages 1-17, January.
    5. Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 1998. "The Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation: A Note," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 115-21, March.
    6. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1999. "Access pricing with unregulated downstream competition," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 73-100, March.
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