Robert H. Hicks () (Department of Economics, College of William and Mary) Alan C. Haynie () (Alaska Fisheries Science Center,National Marine Fisheries Service) Kurt E. Schnier () (Department of Economics,Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University)
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A substantial theoretical and experimental literature has focused on the conditions under which cooperative behavior among actors providing public goods or extracting common-pool resources arises. The literature identifies the importance of coercion, small groups of actors, or the existence of social norms as conducive to cooperation. This research empirically investigates cooperative behavior in a natural resource extraction industry in which the provision of a public good (bycatch avoidance) in the Alaskan flatfish fishery is essential to the duration of the fishing season, and an information provision mechanism exists to relay information to all individuals. Using a mixed logit model of spatial fishing behavior our results show that conditionally cooperative behavior is prevalent but deteriorates as bycatch constraints tighten.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, College of William and Mary in its series Working Papers with number
80.