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A tree formulation for signaling games

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Author Info

  • Dassiou, X.
  • Glycopantis, D.

Abstract

We provide a detailed presentation and complete analysis of the sender/receiver Lewis signaling game using a game theory extensive form, decision tree formulation. The analysis employs well established game theory ideas and concepts. We establish the existence of four perfect Bayesian equilibria in this game. We explain which equilibrium is the most likely to prevail. Our explanation provides an essential step for understanding the formation of a language convention. Further, we discuss the informational content of such signals and calibrate a more detailed definition of a true (“correct”) signal in terms of the payoffs of the sender and the receiver.

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File URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/1455/1/A_Tree_Formulation_for_Signaling_Games.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, City University London in its series Working Papers with number 11/07.

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Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cty:dpaper:11/07

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Social Sciences Building, City University London, Whiskin Street, London, EC1R 0JD, United Kingdom,
Phone: +44 (0)20 7040 8500
Web page: http://www.city.ac.uk
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Related research

Keywords: Signals and signaling games; actions; states of nature; language convention; rational expectations equilibrium; information set; games with imperfect information; Nash equilibrium; perfect Bayesian equilibrium; beliefs updating;

References

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  1. Jeffrey Barrett, 2009. "The Evolution of Coding in Signaling Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 223-237, August.
  2. Binmore, Ken, 2007. "Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300574.
  3. Choi, Chong Ju & Dassiou, Xeni & Gettings, Stephen, 2000. "Herding Behaviour and the Size of Customer Base as a Commitment to Quality," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 67(267), pages 375-98, August.
  4. Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Welch, Ivo, 1992. " Sequential Sales, Learning, and Cascades," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(2), pages 695-732, June.
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