Herding Behaviour and the Size of Customer Base as a Commitment to Quality
AbstractThis paper refers to herding behaviour as developed in Bikhchandani et al. (1992), Bannerjee (1992) and Choi and Scarpa (1994). We examine the behaviour of a potential customer who does not know how many of her predecessors decided not to purchase the product. We show that, ceteris paribus, a smaller (larger) customer base increases the likelihood of a positive (negative) cascade. Hence, a firm can signal its commitment to high quality (Schelling 1960) by choosing to develop a customer base that relies upon the customer's "private" information rather than one that relies on an informational cascade. Copyright 2000 by The London School of Economics and Political Science
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.
Volume (Year): 67 (2000)
Issue (Month): 267 (August)
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- Stone, Daniel F. & Miller, Steven J., 2013. "Leading, learning and herding," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 222-231.
- Dassiou, X. & Glycopantis, D., 2011. "A tree formulation for signaling games," Working Papers 11/07, Department of Economics, City University London.
- Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2006.
"Signal Accuracy and Informational Cascades,"
200620, School Of Economics, University College Dublin.
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