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L’efficacité du Contrôle Communautaire des Concentrations : une approche par la méthode événementielle

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  • Béatrice DUMONT

    (Université de Rennes 1 - CREDEG-CNRS)

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    Abstract

    Le Tribunal de Première Instance des Communautés Européennes (TPICE) a récemment rétorqué trois vetos des autorités communautaires de la concurrence. Au-delà du camouflet que représentent ces décisions, c'est principalement l'insuffisance de preuves et la faiblesse de l'analyse économique de la Commission Européenne qui sont à chaque fois critiquées. Afin d'évaluer la véracité de ces critiques, nous cherchons à analyser de manière précise si les décisions de la Commission sont corroborées par l'anticipation des marchés. Pour se faire, nous utilisons et étendons la méthodologie d'Eckbo-Stillman (1983), plus communément appelée méthode événementielle. Le principe de base en est simple. Il consiste à tester l'hypothèse de pouvoir de marché (ou de collusion) en analysant comment le cours des actions réagit à des événements importants. L'hypothèse testée est la suivante : si la concentration projetée est susceptible de réduire l'intensité de la concurrence (de se traduire par un surcroît d'efficacité), alors les firmes rivales doivent voir leur valeur boursière augmenter (baisser) lors de l'annonce d'un événement augmentant la probabilité de réalisation de la concentration et se déprécier (augmenter) lorsque la probabilité de survenance de celle-ci diminue. Nos résultats montrent que dans la majorité des affaires, il est impossible de valider l'hypothèse d'effets anti-concurrentiels.

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    Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) with number 2004033.

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    Length: 34
    Date of creation: 01 Sep 2004
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2004033

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    Related research

    Keywords: Concentration horizontale; Cours boursier; Efficience; Méthode événementielle;

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    References

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    1. Frédéric Jenny, 1993. "Droit européen de la concurrence et efficience économique," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, Programme National Persée, vol. 63(1), pages 193-206.
    2. Stillman, Robert, 1983. "Examining antitrust policy towards horizontal mergers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 225-240, April.
    3. Bradley, Michael & Desai, Anand & Kim, E. Han, 1983. "The rationale behind interfirm tender offers : Information or synergy?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 183-206, April.
    4. Eckbo, B. Espen, 1983. "Horizontal mergers, collusion, and stockholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 241-273, April.
    5. McAfee, R. Preston & Williams, Michael A., 1988. "Can event studies detect anticompetitive mergers?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 199-203.
    6. Corrado, Charles J., 1989. "A nonparametric test for abnormal security-price performance in event studies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 385-395, August.
    7. Eckbo, B Espen & Wier, Peggy, 1985. "Antimerger Policy under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: A Reexamination of the Market Power Hypothesis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 119-49, April.
    8. Schwert, G William, 1981. "Using Financial Data to Measure Effects of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 121-58, April.
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