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Active Citizen's Income, Unconditional Income and Participation under Imperfect Competition: A Normative Analysis

Author

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  • Van der Linden, Bruno

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) ; Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS))

Abstract

Various types of basic income schemes are considered to compensate the allocative inefficiencies induced by unemployment insurance systems. This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of a unionized economy where participation to the labor market is endogenous and the budget of the State has to balance. It is shown that basic income schemes reduce the equilibrium unemployment rate. The normative analysis suggest that only the active population should be eligible to the basic income. Introducing an `active citizen's income' can be a Pareto-improving reform.

Suggested Citation

  • Van der Linden, Bruno, 1999. "Active Citizen's Income, Unconditional Income and Participation under Imperfect Competition: A Normative Analysis," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 1999023, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:1999023
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    File URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/9923.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Van der Linden, Bruno, 1998. "Fighting unemployment without worsening povety: Basic income versus reductions of social security contributions," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 1999028, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), revised 00 Oct 1999.
    2. Layard, Richard & Nickell, Stephen & Jackman, Richard, 2005. "Unemployment: Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour Market," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199279173, Decembrie.
    3. Besley, Timothy, 1990. "Means Testing versus Universal Provision in Poverty Alleviation Programmes," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 57(225), pages 119-129, February.
    4. L. F. M. Groot & H. M. M. Peeters, 1997. "A Model of Conditional and Unconditional Social Security in an Efficiency Wage Economy: The Economic Sustainability of a Basic Income," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(4), pages 573-597, July.
    5. Creedy, John, 1996. "Comparing Tax and Transfer Systems: Poverty, Inequality and Target Efficiency," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 63(250), pages 163-174, Suppl..
    6. Lockwood, Ben & Manning, Alan, 1993. "Wage setting and the tax system theory and evidence for the United Kingdom," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 1-29, August.
    7. KÉSENNE, Stefan, 1993. "The unemployment impact of a basic income," SESO Working Papers 1993012, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    8. Van der Linden, Bruno, 1997. "Basic income and unemployment in a unionized economy," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 1997014, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), revised 10 Jul 1997.
    9. Burda, Michael & Wyplosz, Charles, 1994. "Gross worker and job flows in Europe," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(6), pages 1287-1315, June.
    10. Pissarides, Christopher A., 1998. "The impact of employment tax cuts on unemployment and wages; The role of unemployment benefits and tax structure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 155-183, January.
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    12. Pierre Cahuc & André Zylberberg, 1999. "Le modèle WS-PS," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 53, pages 1-30.
    13. Danthine, Jean-Pierre & Donaldson, John B., 1990. "Efficiency wages and the business cycle puzzle," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(7), pages 1275-1301, November.
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    16. Manning, Alan, 1993. "Wage Bargaining and the Phillips Curve: The Identification and Specification of Aggregate Wage Equations," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 98-118, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Van der Linden, Bruno, 1998. "Fighting unemployment without worsening povety: Basic income versus reductions of social security contributions," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 1999028, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), revised 00 Oct 1999.
    2. Brigitte Baalen & Tobias Müller, 2014. "Social welfare effects of tax-benefit reform under endogenous participation and unemployment: an ordinal approach," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 21(2), pages 198-227, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Basic income; wage bargaining; unemployment; participation; optimal taxation; ‘`WS-PS' model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy

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