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The Unemployment Benefit System: a Redistributive or an Insurance Institution?

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Author Info
Fernando Sanchez Losada
Daniel Cardona (Universitat de Barcelona)

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Abstract

In this paper we analyze how the composition of labor taxation affects unemployment in a unionized economy with capital accumulation and an unemployment benefit system. We show that if the unemployment benefit system is gross Bismarckian then the unemployment rate is reduced if wage taxes are decreased (and thus payroll taxes are increased). However, if the unemployment benefit system is net Bismarckian then the unemployment rate does not depend on how the system is financed. Besides, in a Beveridgean system the labor tax composition does not affect the unemployment rate if and only if the unemployed do not pay taxes and the employed pay a constant marginal tax rate. We also analyze when an unemployment benefit budget-balanced rule makes the economy to have a hysteresis process.

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Paper provided by Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 129.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:bar:bedcje:2005129

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Postal: Espai de Recerca en Economia, Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques. Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, Num 1-11 08034 Barcelona. Spain.
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs

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  1. Thomas Beissinger & Hartmut Egger, 2004. "Dynamic wage bargaining if benefits are tied to individual wages," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(3), pages 437-460, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Manning, Alan, 1993. "Wage Bargaining and the Phillips Curve: The Identification and Specification of Aggregate Wage Equations," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 98-118, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Layard, Richard & Nickell, Stephen, 1986. "Unemployment in Britain," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 53(210(S)), pages S121-69, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. repec:fth:bfdipa:19/2001 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Oswald, Andrew J., 1993. "Efficient contracts are on the labour demand curve : Theory and facts," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 85-113, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Koskela , Erkki, 2001. "Labour taxation and employment in trade union models: A partial survey," Research Discussion Papers 19/2001, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
  7. Creedy, John & McDonald, Ian M, 1991. "Models of Trade Union Behaviour: A Synthesis," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 67(199), pages 346-59, December.
  8. Nickell, Stephen & Layard, Richard, 1999. "Labor market institutions and economic performance," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 46, pages 3029-3084 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Koskela, Erkki & Schob, Ronnie, 1999. "Does the composition of wage and payroll taxes matter under Nash bargaining?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 343-349, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Lockwood, Ben & Manning, Alan, 1993. "Wage setting and the tax system theory and evidence for the United Kingdom," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 1-29, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Holm, Pasi & Honkapohja, Seppo & Koskela, Erkki, 1994. "A monopoly-union model of wage determination with capital and taxes: An empirical application to the Finnish manufacturing," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 285-303, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Albrecht, James W & Vroman, Susan B, 1999. "Unemployment Compensation Finance and Efficiency Wages," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 141-67, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Layard, Richard & Nickell, Stephen, 1990. "Is Unemployment Lower if Unions Bargain over Employment?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(3), pages 773-87, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Goerke, Laszlo & Madsen, Jakob B., 2003. "Earnings-related unemployment benefits and unemployment," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 41-62, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Francesco Daveri & Guido Tabellini, 2000. "Unemployment, growth and taxation in industrial countries," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 15(30), pages 47-104, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil, 2001. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 370-99, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. Pierre Picard, 2001. "Optimal Employment Subsidies to Heterogeneous Workers: Unemployment-Trap, Job-Additionality and Tax Rates," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 62, pages 06, Avril-Jui. [Downloadable!]
  18. Koskela, Erkki & Vilmunen, Jouko, 1996. "Tax progression is good for employment in popular models of trade union behaviour," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 65-80, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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