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Wage Setting and the Tax System: theory and Evidence for the UK

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  • Ben Lockwood
  • Alan Manning

Abstract

This paper analyses the effect of a non-linear tax system on wage bargaining. The main conclusions are: an increase in the marginal income or payroll tax reduces the pre-tax wage; in the iso-elastic case, an increase in the average tax rate increases the pre-tax wage by more than the tax increase, and a measure of the progressivity of the tax system (residual income progression) is a sufficient measure of the effect of the tax system on wage pressure. Empirical evidence is presented to support these propositions, and the predictions of the model regarding the effect of recent changes to the U.K tax system on the distribution of earnings discussed.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre for Economic Performance, LSE in its series CEP Discussion Papers with number dp0115.

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Date of creation: Jan 1993
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Handle: RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0115

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Web page: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/series.asp?prog=CEP

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Cited by:
  1. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Peter Birch Sørensen, . "Labour Tax Reform, The Good Jobs and the Bad Jobs," EPRU Working Paper Series, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics 99-01, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  2. Etienne Lehmann & Claudio Lucifora & Simone Moriconi & Bruno Van Der Linden, 2013. "Beyond the Labour Income Tax Wedge: The Unemployment-Reducing Effect of Tax Progressivity," Working Papers halshs-00870050, HAL.
  3. Graafland, J.J. & Huizinga, F.H., 1998. "Taxes and benefits in a non-linear wage equation," MPRA Paper 21076, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Aronsson, Thomas & Wikström, Magnus, 2011. "Optimal Tax Progression: Does it Matter if Wage Bargaining is Centralized or Decentralized?," Umeå Economic Studies 829, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
  5. Etienne Lehmann, 2003. "Évaluation de la mise en place d’un système d’allocation universelle en présence de qualifications hétérogènes : le rôle institutionnel du salaire minimum," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 157(1), pages 31-50.
  6. Thomas Aronsson & James R. Walker, 2010. "Labor Supply, Tax Base and Public Policy in Sweden," NBER Chapters, in: Reforming the Welfare State: Recovery and Beyond in Sweden, pages 127-158 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Jonathan Pycroft & Salvador Barrios, 2012. "Effective Green Taxation: Method and application to firm-level data," EcoMod2012 3874, EcoMod.
  8. Kouretas, Georgios P. & Zarangas, Leonidas P., 2000. "Wage Setting, Taxes, and Demand for Labor in Greece: A Multivariate Analysis of Cointegrating Relationships," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 171-195, March.
  9. Pekka Sinko, 2007. "Labour taxation, job creation and job destruction—Focusing on the role of wage setting," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 14(5), pages 583-604, October.
  10. Bokan, Nikola & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 2008. "The Impact of Tax and Market Distortions on the Phillips Curve and the Natural Rate of Unemployment," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, vol. 2(27), pages 1-28.

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