Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Optimal Employment Subsidy to Heterogeneous Workers under Asymmetric Information

Contents:

Author Info

  • Picard, Pierre

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES))

Abstract

It is wellknown that unemployment benefits and minimum income guarantees generate an unemployment trap. The unemployment is indeed not enticed to work because he is imposed at a 100% marginal tax rate. In this paper, we design the optimal employment without risking its budget deficit. The subsidy is applied on top of an initial tax-benefit system that can not be reformed. We show how this subsidy translates the point of 100% marginal tax to workers with lower abilities. Simulations show that full employment can be achieved in many cases. We relate then the properties of such subsidy to those of optimal non-linear taxation models.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) with number 1998009.

as in new window
Length: 41
Date of creation: 01 Apr 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:1998009

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Fax: +32 10473945
Email:
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/ires
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: altruism; habits; catching-up; regime shift;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Picard, Pierre M., 2001. "Job additionality and deadweight spending in perfectly competitive industries: the case for optimal employment subsidies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 521-541, March.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:1998009. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anne DAVISTER-LOGIST).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.