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Rewarding Honest Taxpayers? Evidence on the Impact of Rewards from Field Experiments

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Author Info
Lars P. Feld
Bruno S. Frey
Benno Torgler

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the impact of rewards on tax compliance as an additional instrument to take into account. While social psychologists and neuroscientists have emphasized the importance of rewards, the tax compliance literature has strongly disregarded the possibilities of rewards. The use of field experiments presents an alternative “carrot” strategy for tax policy. Design mechanisms to conduct a field experiments focusing on the impact of rewards on tax compliance are discussed.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) in its series CREMA Working Paper Series with number 2006-16.

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Date of creation: Apr 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cra:wpaper:2006-16

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Related research
Keywords: positive rewards; tax compliance; tax evasion; field experiments;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Lars Feld & Bruno Frey, 2000. "Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers are Treated," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Bruno Frey & Lars Feld, 2002. "Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  3. Glenn W. Harrison & John A. List, 2004. "Field Experiments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(4), pages 1009-1055, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Slemrod, Joel & Blumenthal, Marsha & Christian, Charles, 2001. "Taxpayer response to an increased probability of audit: evidence from a controlled experiment in Minnesota," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 455-483, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Alm, James & Cronshaw, Mark B & McKee, Michael, 1993. "Tax Compliance with Endogenous Audit Selection Rules," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(1), pages 27-45.
  6. Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2006. "A theory of reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 293-315, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Benno Torgler, 2003. "Beyond Punishment: a tax compliance experiment with taxpayers in Costa Rica," Revista de Analisis Economico – Economic Analysis Review, Ilades-Georgetown University, Economics Department, vol. 18(1), pages 27-56, June. [Downloadable!]
  8. Falk, Armin & Kosfeld, Michael, 2004. "Distrust - The Hidden Cost of Control," IZA Discussion Papers 1203, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Burtless, Gary, 1995. "The Case for Randomized Field Trials in Economic and Policy Research," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 63-84, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Torgler, Benno, 2002. " Speaking to Theorists and Searching for Facts: Tax Morale and Tax Compliance in Experiments," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(5), pages 657-83, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Ernst Fehr & John A. List, 2004. "The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives - Trust and Trustworthiness among CEOs," Artefactual Field Experiments 0039, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Alm, James & McClelland, Gary H. & Schulze, William D., 1992. "Why do people pay taxes?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 21-38, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, 2003. "Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism," Microeconomics 0305007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  16. Feld, Lars P & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2002. "Tax Evasion and Voting: An Experimental Analysis," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(2), pages 197-222.
  17. Pyle, D J, 1991. " The Economics of Taxpayer Compliance," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 5(2), pages 163-98.
  18. Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(3), pages 489-520, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Yano, Yuki & Blandford, David, 2008. "Use of Penalties and Rewards in Agri-Environmental Policy," 82nd Annual Conference, March 31 - April 2, 2008, Royal Agricultural College, Cirencester, UK 36873, Agricultural Economics Society. [Downloadable!]
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